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The Ghost of Anti-communism Reflected in South Korean Media
Written by Ji-Hyun Lee, Peace Network Intern
Upon the issuance of the February 13 agreement at the six-party talks, all the conservative South Korean newspapers, including, unfortunately, the country’s three most widely circulated newspapers—the Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo and Joong Ang Ilbo—simultaneously made comments devaluing the agreement. Some examples include: “Ultimately, should a final agreement be reached at the next round of six-party talks, it would be the same as the 1994 Geneva Agreement where North Korea freezes its nuclear program in exchange for alternative energy supplies from the international community. The only difference this time is the fact that Korea should bear a much higher portion of the burden,” “North Korea needs only the few nuclear weapons it already has to take South Korea hostage. Until those weapons and materials plus the uranium facilities have been inspected and scrapped, the dark nuclear cloud will hang over the Korean Peninsula,” and “The basic framework for the current agreement repeats the framework of the 1994 agreement. What is even more problematic is that nuclear weapons currently in the North’s possession were not even mentioned in the negotiations.” Just as the North Korean nuclear issue was beginning to be resolved, the media was full of dire predictions. Regarding the bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S. for normalizing their hostile relations, the media, which tends to have a conservative political ideology, criticized the U.S. for shifting its policy on North Korea, asserting that the Bush administration is desperate for diplomatic achievements and that it was defeated strategically. It even condemned Seoul and Washington, pointing out that both face a presidential election in the near future.
However, regardless of why Washington shifted its policy on North Korea, there is no reason to unduly criticize the February 13 agreement. It is the first significant and actual step of implementation for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Dismantling all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs is covered by the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, and the February 13 agreement signifies the implementation of the Joint Statement.
Moreover, there are no alternatives suggested by the negative views of the February 13 agreement and its process of implementation. Merely blaming the South Korean government’s policy of engagement for the North Korean nuclear test or insisting that the sunshine policy might supply money for the North to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, they claim that any negotiation with or aid to North Korea, which has nuclear weapons, should not be permitted.
Furthermore, the South Korean media perpetuates the belief that Korea’s humanitarian assistance to North Korea is a useful card in negotiating with the North. Since North Korea’s missile test last year, Seoul stopped providing all aid, including humanitarian assistance, to Pyongyang, but this did not provide any leverage in negotiations. Rather, it further obstructed South-North relations.
What is wrong with the major media outlets in Korea? Under Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship, North Korea, a weak nation, has developed nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the threat of an American attack, as exemplified by the Iraq war, and as a diplomatic tool for bilateral contact with the U.S. But Korea’s top newspapers are continuously reproducing the hostility of the last fifty years between the two Koreas, even in the midst of talks, without presenting any alternatives. They are concerned that if an inter-Korean summit were held while President Roh Moo-hyun is in office, it would be advantageous for the Uri party, which the major media dislikes or opposes in the next presidential election.
Mired in domestic politics and anti-communism rooted in the cold war, Korea’s major newspapers spread a hostile perspective of North Korea on the Korean peninsula. Although the path to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula will not be easy, Koreans need to be aggressive optimists and maintain a positive outlook, more so than any others, in resolving the nuclear issue and gradually building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The Korean Unification minister has stated that the restoration of rice aid will be in accordance with give-and-take progress based on the February 13 Agreement. However, in dealing with the North, South Korea’s card lies not in adjusting its humanitarian aid to North Korea in accordance with the degree of resolution of the nuclear issue, but rather in maintaining mutual trust in inter-Korean relations.
Written by Ji-Hyun Lee, Peace Network Intern
Upon the issuance of the February 13 agreement at the six-party talks, all the conservative South Korean newspapers, including, unfortunately, the country’s three most widely circulated newspapers—the Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo and Joong Ang Ilbo—simultaneously made comments devaluing the agreement. Some examples include: “Ultimately, should a final agreement be reached at the next round of six-party talks, it would be the same as the 1994 Geneva Agreement where North Korea freezes its nuclear program in exchange for alternative energy supplies from the international community. The only difference this time is the fact that Korea should bear a much higher portion of the burden,” “North Korea needs only the few nuclear weapons it already has to take South Korea hostage. Until those weapons and materials plus the uranium facilities have been inspected and scrapped, the dark nuclear cloud will hang over the Korean Peninsula,” and “The basic framework for the current agreement repeats the framework of the 1994 agreement. What is even more problematic is that nuclear weapons currently in the North’s possession were not even mentioned in the negotiations.” Just as the North Korean nuclear issue was beginning to be resolved, the media was full of dire predictions. Regarding the bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S. for normalizing their hostile relations, the media, which tends to have a conservative political ideology, criticized the U.S. for shifting its policy on North Korea, asserting that the Bush administration is desperate for diplomatic achievements and that it was defeated strategically. It even condemned Seoul and Washington, pointing out that both face a presidential election in the near future.
However, regardless of why Washington shifted its policy on North Korea, there is no reason to unduly criticize the February 13 agreement. It is the first significant and actual step of implementation for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Dismantling all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs is covered by the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, and the February 13 agreement signifies the implementation of the Joint Statement.
Moreover, there are no alternatives suggested by the negative views of the February 13 agreement and its process of implementation. Merely blaming the South Korean government’s policy of engagement for the North Korean nuclear test or insisting that the sunshine policy might supply money for the North to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, they claim that any negotiation with or aid to North Korea, which has nuclear weapons, should not be permitted.
Furthermore, the South Korean media perpetuates the belief that Korea’s humanitarian assistance to North Korea is a useful card in negotiating with the North. Since North Korea’s missile test last year, Seoul stopped providing all aid, including humanitarian assistance, to Pyongyang, but this did not provide any leverage in negotiations. Rather, it further obstructed South-North relations.
What is wrong with the major media outlets in Korea? Under Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship, North Korea, a weak nation, has developed nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the threat of an American attack, as exemplified by the Iraq war, and as a diplomatic tool for bilateral contact with the U.S. But Korea’s top newspapers are continuously reproducing the hostility of the last fifty years between the two Koreas, even in the midst of talks, without presenting any alternatives. They are concerned that if an inter-Korean summit were held while President Roh Moo-hyun is in office, it would be advantageous for the Uri party, which the major media dislikes or opposes in the next presidential election.
Mired in domestic politics and anti-communism rooted in the cold war, Korea’s major newspapers spread a hostile perspective of North Korea on the Korean peninsula. Although the path to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula will not be easy, Koreans need to be aggressive optimists and maintain a positive outlook, more so than any others, in resolving the nuclear issue and gradually building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The Korean Unification minister has stated that the restoration of rice aid will be in accordance with give-and-take progress based on the February 13 Agreement. However, in dealing with the North, South Korea’s card lies not in adjusting its humanitarian aid to North Korea in accordance with the degree of resolution of the nuclear issue, but rather in maintaining mutual trust in inter-Korean relations.
